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Despite intensive scrutiny, the effects of Medicaid expansions on the health insurance status of
low-income children remain controversial.  We re-examine the effects of the two largest
federally-mandated expansions which offered Medicaid coverage to low-income children in
specific age ranges and birth cohorts.  We use a regression discontinuity approach, comparing
Medicaid enrollment, private insurance coverage, and overall insurance coverage on either side
of the age limits of the laws.  We conclude that the modest impacts of the expansions on health
insurance coverage arose because of very low takeup rates of the newly available coverage, rather
than from crowd-out of private insurance coverage.  
JEL No. I18, I381These data are drawn from the March 1989, 1993, and 1999 Current Population Surveys
(CPS).  The samples include individuals age 0-18 who are neither a family head nor a spouse of a
head.  See the Data Appendix for more information.
2Using a very similar methodology Currie and Gruber (1996) estimated a comparable
takeup rate for Medicaid.
Concerns about the adequacy of health insurance coverage for children have expanded
Medicaid from a narrowly targeted program for welfare recipients and the disabled to a broadly
based program for low-income families.  A series of legislative changes during the 1980s
allowed states to offer Medicaid coverage to children in married-couple families with incomes
below the eligibility limits for welfare, and to young children in higher income families. 
Legislation at the close of the decade expanded the program further, requiring states to cover all
children below certain age limits in low-income families.  Despite these efforts, health insurance
coverage rates for children with family incomes near the poverty line remain below those of
richer or poorer children.  Figure 1, for example, shows the fraction of children in various family
income groups with health insurance coverage in 1989, 1993, and 1999.
1   While coverage rose
in the early 1990s for children with family incomes above the eligibility limits for welfare but
below the poverty line, the expansions only partially closed the gap between the traditional
welfare system and private insurance.
A series of recent studies has offered different explanations for the modest effect of the
Medicaid expansions.  Cutler and Gruber (1996) estimated that about one-quarter of the children
made newly eligible by the expansions between 1987 and 1992 actually enrolled in Medicaid. 
However, they argued that the net effect on overall insurance coverage was less than half this big
because of the crowding-out of private coverage.
2   Subsequent researchers, including Dubay and
Kenney (1996), Shore-Sheppard (2000), Yazici and Kaestner (2000),  Blumberg et al. (2000),2
3See Angrist and Krueger (1999) for a discussion of program evaluation methods that
focus on “discontinuous” program eligibility rules, and a survey of recent applications.
and Ham and Shore-Sheppard (forthcoming), have estimated smaller effects of the expansions on
Medicaid enrollment and lower rates of crowding-out.  While the net impacts on insurance
coverage are  similar across studies, the question of whether the modest effect arises primarily
because of significant crowding-out of private insurance or because of low takeup of the newly
available Medicaid coverage is of central importance.  The crowd-out explanation suggests that
further gains in coverage can only be achieved with substantial cost shifting from the private to
the public sector.   The takeup explanation, on the other hand, suggests that information outreach
and simplified application procedures for Medicaid might have a significant impact on total
coverage, with little loss of private coverage.
In this paper we re-examine the effects of the Medicaid expansions, focusing on two key
federal laws:  the “133 percent” expansion covering children under the age of six in families with
incomes less than 133 percent of the poverty line (included in the 1989 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act), and the “100 percent” expansion covering children born after September 30,
1983 in families below the poverty line  (included in the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act).  In addition to generating a majority of the eligibility increase attributable to the Medicaid
expansions, these two laws have the feature that their effects can be evaluated by a simple
“regression discontinuity” approach.
3  Under the 133 percent expansion, five year olds in families
with incomes from 100 to 133 percent of the poverty line became eligible for Medicaid, whereas
six year olds did not.   Under the 100 percent provision, children born in October 1983 with
family incomes below the poverty line were eligible for Medicaid, whereas children born just one3
month earlier were not.  Comparisons between children on either side of the eligibility
boundaries provide credible and transparent evidence that can help resolve the question of how
the expansions actually affected health insurance coverage.
Our results, based on data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the
March Current Population Survey, and the Health Interview Survey, point to two main
conclusions.  First, takeup rates for newly-available Medicaid coverage under the 100 percent
expansion were around 7-11 percent – only about one-half as large as the estimates of Cutler and
Gruber (1996) and Currie and Gruber (1996).  Our estimated takeup rates for coverage under the
133 percent expansion are even lower – on the order of 5 percent or less.  Second, our estimates
of the effects of the expansions on private insurance coverage are also small (although we cannot
rule out a small negative effect).  Thus, our evidence is more consistent with a low takeup
explanation for the modest effects of the Medicaid expansions than a crowd-out explanation.  In
light of these findings we also present some new evidence on the robustness of the takeup and
crowd-out estimates in Cutler and Gruber (1996).  We conclude that the relatively large takeup
and crowd-out estimates reported by Cutler and Gruber (1996) arise from their restrictive
empirical specifications (which omit any age-specific trends in coverage) rather than from the use
of state-level variation in Medicaid eligibility.  More general specifications, including ones that
rely on state-specific Medicaid laws, yield estimated takeup and crowd-out rates very similar to
ours.4
II.  The Medicaid Expansions
Medicaid eligibility for non-disabled children was originally limited to single-parent
families receiving cash assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program.  Over the 1980s the link between Medicaid and welfare was gradually severed, starting
in 1984 with the Ribicoff program, which allowed states to enroll children in two-parent families
with incomes below the AFDC thresholds, and the Deficit Reduction Act, which required states
to cover children less than five years old born after September 30, 1983 living in families
income-eligible for AFDC, regardless of family structure.   Further decoupling occurred with
passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts (OBRA) of 1986 and 1987, which allowed
states to raise the income limits for Medicaid eligibility above the AFDC thresholds.  OBRA
1987 also required states to cover all children less than seven years old born after September 30,
1983 living in families with incomes below the AFDC income threshold.  Federally mandated
coverage was extended by the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA, effective July 1989)
and Family Support Act (FSA, effective October 1990).  The MCCA required states to cover
pregnant women and infants in families with incomes up to 75 percent of the poverty line, and
permitted coverage of children up to age eight in these families.  The FSA required states to
continue Medicaid coverage for up to one year for families who lost AFDC benefits due to
increased earnings.
The two largest federal expansions –  and the focus of the analysis in this paper – were
included in OBRA 1989 and OBRA 1990.  Effective April 1990, OBRA 1989 required states to
offer Medicaid coverage to pregnant women and children up to age six with family incomes
below 133 percent of the federal poverty level (the “133 percent expansion”).  Effective July5
4Two other federal rule changes allowed states to expand Medicaid eligibility.  The
“Section 1902(r)(2) option” permitted states to adopt more liberal standards for calculating
income and resources for some categories of eligibility.  The “Section 1115 waiver option”
allowed states to apply for a research and demonstration waiver.  Such waivers could include
higher income limits for Medicaid.  Neither rule change is likely to affect our analysis.  Although
the 1902(r)(2) option was added to the Medicaid rules as part of the MCCA, states did not take
advantage of it until 1992, and the first waivers to involve eligibility were implemented in 1994.
5See the Data Appendix for details of our eligibility imputation.
6Currie and Gruber (1996, Table 1) estimate a 7 percentage point rise in Medicaid
eligibility between March 1990 and March 1992.
1991, OBRA 1990 required states to cover children born after September 30, 1983 with family
incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty level (the “100 percent expansion”).  These
children continue to be covered until they reach the age of 18.
4
Table 1 summarizes the impact of the Medicaid expansions on the eligibility rate of
children age 18 or younger, using data from the 1988-1994 March Current Population Surveys.
5 
The first column shows the overall fraction of children eligible for Medicaid in each year, while
the second shows the fraction eligible for AFDC or AFDC-related programs (AFDC-UP,
Ribicoff, and the DEFRA expansion).  This group, virtually all of whom are AFDC-eligible and
thus would have been eligible for Medicaid without any expansions, is relatively stable at about
16-17 percent of children.  The third column shows the fraction of children eligible under the
federally-mandated infant coverage provisions of the MCCA.  After 1991 this fraction is also
relatively stable at about one-tenth of 1 percent of children.  The next two columns show the
fractions of children eligible under the 133 percent expansion (OBRA 1989) and the 100 percent
expansion (OBRA 1990).  By 1994, these laws  had increased eligibility for Medicaid by 6.3
percentage points – an almost 50 percent increase in the potential coverage of the system.
6  6
7For example, Cutler and Gruber (1996, page 402) note that ...  “90 percent of children
made eligible between 1987 and 1992 qualified for Medicaid under federally imposed minimum
guidelines.”
8In contrast, the March CPS has information on family structure at the interview date,
total income in the previous calendar year, and insurance coverage at any time in the previous
year.  See Bennefield (1996) and Nelson and Mills (2001) for comparisons of health insurance
data in the SIPP and CPS.
Finally, the last column in Table 1 shows the fraction of children eligible under various optional
state programs.  Very few states took advantage of the optional coverage provisions until the
early 1990s.  Even as late as 1992 only about 1 percent of children were eligible under state
optional programs.  As noted by other researchers, the main source of the rise in Medicaid
coverage for children in the late 1980s and early 1990s were the federal mandates passed in
OBRA 1989 and OBRA 1990.
7
III.  Measuring the Effects of the OBRA 1989 and OBRA 1990 Expansions
Data Sources
We use three different data sources to measure the effects of the federally mandated
Medicaid expansions in 1990 and 1991.  Our primary evidence is drawn from the first wave
interviews of the 1990-1993 Surveys of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  These data
have the advantage that family composition, income, and program participation are all recorded
for the month just before the interview, reducing the scope for recall errors and minimizing the
gaps between Medicaid eligibility rules and observed characteristics.
8   A second key feature of
the SIPP (also shared by the Health Interview Survey) is that the public use samples report month7
9Currie and Gruber (1996) use this measure as well as the probability of a doctor visit in
the past two weeks, the probability of hospitalization last year, and the probability of visiting a
doctor’s office, hospital emergency room or clinic, or other site.
and year of birth.  This information allows us to form precise comparison groups of children on
either side of the Medicaid eligibility thresholds.
The SIPP data have two notable limitations: small sample sizes, and the lack of state
identifiers for people living in nine smaller states (Maine, Vermont, Iowa, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming).  Since we need state information to assign AFDC
and Medicaid eligibility, we exclude residents of these states from our SIPP analysis.  To cross-
check the SIPP findings and provide a broader perspective, we use data from the 1990-1996
March Current Population Surveys (CPS) and the 1992-1996 Health Interview Surveys (HIS). 
The HIS also includes information on recent doctor visits that we use as an indicator of health
care access.
9
From each of the three data sources we constructed samples of children age 18 or younger
who are not heading their own families (see the Data Appendix for more details).  The age, race,
and ethnicity distributions in the three samples are similar (see Appendix Table 1).  The three
data sources also give similar estimates of the fraction of children in poverty, or near poverty.
Despite important differences in the time frame of the health insurance coverage questions, the
SIPP and CPS show roughly comparable Medicaid and health insurance coverage rates.  The HIS
yields Medicaid coverage rates similar to the other two data sets, but a slightly lower overall
health insurance coverage rate.8
An Overview of  Medicaid Eligibility and Participation in the Early 1990s 
Table 2 provides an overview of the children in our SIPP sample.   Focusing first on the
age characteristics, a relatively large fraction of children – roughly one-third – were under the age
of six and therefore potentially eligible for Medicaid under the 133 percent (OBRA 1989)
expansion.  A smaller fraction was too old for the 133 percent rule but was born after September
30, 1983 and therefore potentially eligible under the 100 percent (OBRA 1990) expansion.
The OBRA 1989 and 1990 expansions were targeted at children in families with incomes
above the AFDC threshold in their state of residence, but below 100 or 133 percent of the
poverty line.   On average the AFDC income limit faced by children in the 1990 subsample was
68.9 percent of the family-specific poverty line, although the limit ranged from less than 30
percent of the poverty line (in some Southern states) to just over the poverty line (in some high-
benefit states like California).  Over the later years of our sample the average ratio of the AFDC
limit to the poverty line declined, reflecting benefit cuts in some states and the impact of
inflation.   Nevertheless, the fraction of children with family incomes below the AFDC cutoff
rose from 16.4 percent in 1990 to 18.6 percent in 1993.  The fraction above the AFDC limit but
below the poverty line also increased, from 5.5 to 8.1 percent, while the fraction with family
incomes between 100 and 133 percent of the poverty line was fairly stable at around 7 percent.
As in Table 1, we can classify Medicaid eligibility for children in our SIPP sample
according to whether they were eligible through the AFDC program or a federal or state
expansion.  (In this table we focus on the financial eligibility limits and ignore the family
structure rules in non-Ribicoff states).  The expansions in place in 1990 raised the average
Medicaid income limit (relative to the poverty line) by 8.3 percentage points above the9
10There was a similar rise in the takeup rate of other benefit programs in the early 1990s,
including food stamps – see Currie (2003).  
11Since most children in families with incomes below the AFDC limit were eligible for
welfare-based coverage, we exclude anyone whose family-specific AFDC cutoff exceeds 70
percent of the poverty line.   An examination of AFDC participation rates shows that welfare
participation falls off very quickly once the income-to-poverty ratio is within 10 percent of the
corresponding AFDC limit, and extended coverage to about 1.7 percent more children than were
eligible under AFDC.  Over the next three years, the OBRA 1989 and OBRA 1990 expansions,
coupled with state-level programs, raised the average Medicaid income cutoff to 112 percent of
the poverty line and raised the fraction of children eligible for Medicaid by 62 percent.
The final rows in Table 2 present data on actual participation in AFDC and Medicaid. 
Welfare participation rose faster than estimated eligibility in the early 1990s, from 8.4 percent in
1990 to 12 percent in 1994.
10  The fraction of children covered by Medicaid and not on AFDC
increased slightly faster, from 3.7 percent to 7.7 percent.   These trends imply that the increase in
Medicaid enrollment in the early 1990s arose from a combination of three factors: a rise in the
fraction of children eligible for Medicaid through the regular welfare system; a rise in the welfare
participation rate among those families eligible for welfare; and a rise in the fraction of children
eligible for benefits through the Medicaid expansions. 
IV.  The OBRA 1990 (100 Percent) Expansion 
We begin our analysis of the Medicaid expansions by focusing on the OBRA 1990
legislation.  Figure 2 shows estimated Medicaid eligibility rates by quarter of birth for children in
the 1992 and 1993 SIPPs with family incomes just below the poverty line (60-100 percent of
poverty) and just above (100-140 percent of poverty).
11  The graph illustrates the sharp10
AFDC cutoff.  We build this 10 point gap into our sample exclusion.
12The lines in Figures 2-5 are smoothed using a 3-quarter moving average with weights
(0.3, 0.4, 0.3).  
13The rise is gradual rather than discrete because we pool children from two SIPP panels
who are surveyed at different dates.
14There are 25-30 children per birth quarter in the 60-100 percent poverty group in the
combined 1992 and 1993 SIPPs.  Thus, the standard error of the estimated Medicaid participation
rate for a single birth quarter is about 8 percentage points.
discontinuity in Medicaid eligibility induced by the 100 percent expansion.
12  For children in
families below the poverty line, Medicaid eligibility rates jump from 6-8 percent for those born
before September 1983 to 100 percent for those born after.  Among higher-income children, by
comparison, eligibility rates are about 6-8 percent on either side of the 1983-III breakpoint. 
Further to the right the eligibility rate for the above-poverty group starts to rise, as the higher-
income children fall below age six at the interview date and qualify for Medicaid under OBRA
1989.
13  This underscores the importance of focusing on comparisons close to the September
1983 cutoff in trying to evaluate the 100 percent expansion.
Figure 3 shows corresponding patterns of Medicaid coverage.  There is a discernable
jump in Medicaid enrollment for the below-poverty group between the 1983-III and 1983-IV
birth cohorts, with no such jump for the above-poverty group.  Moreover, coverage rates of the
below poverty group are fairly stable on either side of the eligibility cutoff, suggesting that the
jump is not just a random blip.
14   It is also interesting to note that despite the rise in Medicaid
eligibility noted in Figure 2 for the above-poverty sample born 12-16 quarters after 1983-III,
there is no parallel rise in enrollment.  This is consistent with other evidence (presented below)
that the 133 percent expansion had little effect on Medicaid enrollment. 11
15As in Figures 2 and 3 , the samples used in Figure 4 exclude children whose AFDC
cutoff is greater than 70 percent of the family-specific poverty line.
16See for example Pischke (1995), who fits a variety of models to monthly family income
from the SIPP.   In our samples, the correlation of monthly family incomes measured 6 months
apart is around 0.80.  
The rules of the 100 percent expansion also create discontinuities in eligibility by family
income.  In particular, for children born after September 1983, one would expect Medicaid
coverage to fall off as family income passes through the poverty line, whereas there should be no
such effect for children born earlier.  Figure 4 graphs Medicaid coverage rates by family income
for children in the 1992 and 1993 SIPP samples born before and after the OBRA 1990 cutoff
date.
15   A key difference between these comparisons and those in Figure 3 is that a child’s birth
date is fixed, whereas family income can vary from month to month.
16  Since Medicaid
enrollment is time-consuming, families will not necessarily enroll if their incomes are only
temporarily low, leading to some fuzziness in the discontinuity by income.  Moreover, incomes
are measured with error and SIPP-reported income does not necessarily correspond to the income
that would be declared on an application for Medicaid.  Consistent with these facts, there is a
more gradual shift in Medicaid coverage around the poverty line in Figure 4 than at the 1983-III
cohort cutoff in Figure 3.  Nevertheless, the data in Figure 4 suggest an effect of OBRA 1990. 
Above the poverty line, Medicaid coverage rates are fairly similar for the older and younger
cohorts.  Below the poverty line the coverage rate of the younger cohort is 10 percentage points
higher.12
Differences-in-Differences and Regression-Discontinuity Estimates
The evidence in Figures 3 and 4 can be evaluated more formally by constructing
“differences in differences” of health insurance outcomes for children just above and just below
the poverty line who were born before and after September 30, 1983.   The results are presented
in Table 3.   For the post-September 1983 cohort we present means including all children, and
means for the subset who were age six or older as of the SIPP survey.  Focusing on children six
or older eliminates the problem that younger children in the higher-income group are potentially
eligible for Medicaid through the 133 percent expansion.
Consistent with Figure 2, the entries in the second column of the table show a big
difference in eligibility rates for below-poverty children born before and after 1983-III, and a
much smaller difference for the above-poverty children.  Indeed, once the sample is restricted to
children older than six (to eliminate potential overlap with the 133 percent expansion) the
difference in differences is 91 percent.  Pooling all children, however, the difference in
differences falls to 46 percent, reflecting the “contamination” of the above-poverty/post-
September 1983 group by children who are eligible under the 133 percent program.
One way to focus directly on the discontinuity in coverage around the September 1983
cutoff is to construct regression-adjusted differences in differences that include smooth functions
of age and income, as well as controls for age under six and other factors.   In particular, consider
the following regression model for the event of Medicaid eligibility (Y):
(1)  Y  =   a  + b1 Poor  + b2 (Born After 9/30/83) + b3 Poor × (Born After 9/30/83) 
              +  b4 (Age<6)  +  b5 (Age<6) × (1MPoor)   +  G(Age,  Income)   + d X   + e , 13
where “Poor” is an indicator for family income under the poverty line, “Age” represents an
individual’s age,  “Income” represents family income relative to the poverty line, G( ) is some
smooth function of age and income  (e.g., a low order polynomial), and X is a set of other
characteristics (e.g., year dummies and controls for race and ethnicity).  This specification allows
the outcome variable Y to vary smoothly with age and family income, and to exhibit possible
discontinuities as family income reaches the poverty line, or the child’s birth date approaches
September 30, 1983, or the child reaches age six.   The impact of OBRA 1990 (the 100%
expansion) is identified by the coefficient b3 of the interaction between poverty status and birth
cohort.  Any confounding effect of OBRA 1989 is captured by the coefficient b5 of the 
interaction between age less than six and above-poverty status.  
If equation (1) is restricted to include only the first three terms, then the coefficient b3 
equals the difference in differences of the outcome Y for children born before and after
September 1983 in above- and below-poverty families.  The addition of a flexible G( ) function
shifts the source of identification from a global difference in differences to a local one,
concentrated around the eligibility threshold.   It is important to note that the coefficients of the 
age and income controls in the G( ) function need not reflect true causal effects.  For example, if
higher income families have stronger tastes for health insurance, the coefficients will reflect both
the income elasticity of demand and the variation of tastes for insurance across the population.  
As long as these combined factors are smooth functions of income, however, their contribution14
17The regression discontinuity approach may fail if families adjust their incomes to take
advantage of the eligibility laws.  Such behavior will lead to a “regression discontinuity” in the
characteristics of families on either side of the eligibility thresholds.  We tested for a
discontinuity in race and found no evidence of selective sorting of families around the income
thresholds.
18The results from other specifications, including polynomials of different orders and
various interactions, are all very similar.
will not affect the estimated “regression discontinuity” identified by the b3 coefficient (see
Angrist and Krueger, 1999).
17
The regression-adjusted differences in differences in Table 3 include a cubic in age, a
quadratic in income (relative to poverty), dummies for race, Hispanic ethnicity, and living with a
single mother, and interactions of year effects with 4 region effects.
18  Looking first at the
eligibility models, when the comparison is restricted to children age six and older, the regression-
adjusted estimate of the eligibility effect is nearly identical to the unadjusted difference in
differences (92 percent).  Although the simple difference in difference falls dramatically when
younger children are added to the sample, the regression adjusted estimate remains very stable,
suggesting that the addition of the age and income controls shifts the source of identification for
the b3 coefficient to the discontinuity point.
The models for Medicaid coverage (in column 3 of Table 3) imply that the 100 percent
expansion led to a 7 percentage point rise in enrollment for children close to the eligibility limits. 
As with the eligibility models, the coverage effects from the regression-adjusted models are
similar whether or not children under six are included.   Since the 100 percent program increased
eligibility by about 92 percent and increased coverage by 7 percent, the implied takeup rate15
19Taking the ratio of the coverage and eligibility effects is equivalent to an instrumental
variables (IV) estimate of the effect of Medicaid eligibility on Medicaid coverage, using the
interaction of poverty status and pre-September 1983 birth cohort as an instrument for eligibility.  
The corresponding OLS estimate is 7.5 percent with a standard error of 2.4 percent.  
20Some children have both Medicaid and other coverage.  Thus, the coefficients for
Medicaid coverage and non-Medicaid coverage do not “add up” to the coefficient in the model
for any coverage. 
among the newly eligible group is 7.7 percent (with a standard error of 3.6 percent).
19  This
estimate is substantially below the 20 percent takeup rate estimated by Cutler and Gruber (1996)
for the combined federal and state expansions over the 1985-93 period, but closer to estimates
obtained by other researchers. 
The models in the remaining columns of Table 3 analyze AFDC participation, Medicaid
coverage outside of AFDC, overall health insurance coverage, and the presence of non-Medicaid
insurance.  The results for AFDC and for Medicaid coverage outside of AFDC can be interpreted
as specification checks.  In principle, the change in the Medicaid income limit should not have
affected AFDC participation: thus, the entire rise in Medicaid associated with the rise in
eligibility should have occurred outside AFDC.  This is confirmed by the unadjusted and
regression-adjusted differences in differences.
The results for any health insurance, and for other (i.e., non-Medicaid) insurance, address
the issue of crowd-out.  The unadjusted difference in differences that includes children under six
shows some evidence of crowd-out, with a smaller rise in total coverage than in Medicaid, and a
decline in other coverage.
20  However, the preferred specifications that either exclude children
under six or add controls for age, income, and coverage under the 133 percent program show no
such patterns.  16
We have performed a number of specification tests to probe the robustness of the results
in Table 3.  One test is to redo the analysis using data from 1990 and 1991, before the 100
percent expansion took effect.  Unfortunately, this exercise is not very informative because there
are very few children in the right income range who were at least six years old in 1990 or 1991
and were born after September 1983 (a total of only 120 observations).  Using this small sample,
the difference in differences in Medicaid coverage prior to the effective date of the 100 percent
expansion is actually negative, providing no evidence of a positive bias in the 1992-93 results.
A second test is to drop the exclusion restriction that eliminates children in high-AFDC
benefit states.   The main impact of this change is to raise the Medicaid eligibility and
participation rates of the below-poverty group born before October 1983.  As a consequence, the
regression-adjusted difference in differences in eligibility falls to 74.4 percent, the corresponding
effect on Medicaid coverage falls to 5.9 percent (standard error 3.5), and the effect on overall
health insurance falls to 6.5 percent (standard error 4.0).  For this broader sample the implied
takeup rate of Medicaid coverage by newly eligible children is 7.9 percent (standard error 3.3
percent) – quite similar to the estimate using the narrower sample, as would be expected if all the
changes in the broader sample are generated by behavioral reactions among children above the
AFDC limit.
A third test is to augment the sample for 1992 and 1993 with data from the earlier panels.  
For example, month 16 of the 1991 panel represents the same calendar period as month 4 of the
1992 panel.  We included these data (for the 90 percent of the 1991 panel who were still in the
sample at their 16
th month) and re-estimated the models in Table 3.  The results are very similar
to those in Table 3, though with a somewhat smaller estimate of the overall health insurance17
21To avoid issues of AFDC eligibility, the underlying samples exclude children in
families whose AFDC income limit is above 100 percent of the poverty line.  This affects a
relatively small number of children.
22The lines in Figure 5 are smoothed as in Figure 3.  There are 40-50 observations per
quarter for both income groups, slightly more than in the samples in Figure 3.
effects.  The regression-adjusted estimate of the Medicaid coverage effect is 7.7 percent (standard
error 3.3) while the corresponding estimate of the overall health insurance effect is 6.7 percent
(standard error 4.1).   We continue to find little evidence of crowding out: the regression-adjusted
estimate for other coverage is -1.0 (standard error 4.2).  Adding in data for month 28 of the 1990
panel similarly has very little effect on the results.
V.  The OBRA 1989 (133 Percent) Expansion
Like the 100 percent expansion, the 133 percent expansion generated sharp
discontinuities in Medicaid eligibility.  As a first step in evaluating this expansion, we compare
children older or younger than six in families with incomes from 100 to 133 percent of the
poverty line to similar age groups in families with incomes from 133 to 166 percent of the
poverty line.  Figure 5 shows Medicaid coverage rates by age measured in quarters for the two
groups, using data from the 1991-1993 SIPP samples.
21  Contrary to the pattern in Figure 3, there
is no evidence of a jump in Medicaid coverage at the age limit of the 133 percent program.
22  A
graph of Medicaid coverage by family income similarly shows no evidence of a drop in coverage
as income reaches 133 percent of poverty among the under-six children.
Table 4 presents means of Medicaid eligibility and coverage for children older or younger
than six in families with incomes below and above the cutoff of the 133 percent program, along18
with raw and regression-adjusted differences in differences.  The results in the second column
show that the 133 percent expansion raised Medicaid eligibility of the target group by about 85
percent.  Unlike the 100 percent expansion, however, we can find no corresponding effect on
Medicaid coverage or health insurance coverage.  To check whether these estimates might reflect
a slow diffusion of  knowledge about the 133 percent program, we constructed differences in
differences using data for 1992 and 1993 only.  The results, shown in the bottom row of Table 4,
are not much different from the results based on 1991-1993.   We also tried various changes in
the sample (e.g., narrowing the income limits of the affected and unaffected groups around the
133 percent income cutoff, and narrowing the age range), but found no change in the results.
A limitation of the analysis in Table 4 is that it focuses on only some of the children who
were affected by the 133 percent expansion – those in families with incomes from 100 to 133
percent of poverty.  OBRA 1989 also extended coverage to children under the age of six with
family incomes below the poverty line who were subsequently eligible under the 100 percent
expansion.  By pooling a wider range of age and income groups and including indicators for the
various age/poverty subgroups, it is possible to determine whether this “doubly eligible” group
responded more like the older/lower income group affected by the 100 percent expansion, or
more like the younger/higher income group affected by the 133 percent expansion.  The results of
this exercise – using SIPP data for 1992 and 1993 for children with family incomes from 60 to
166 percent of the poverty line – are reported in Table 5.   We report the coefficients from an
expanded version of equation (1) that includes polynomials in age and income, a dummy for
children under six, a dummy for those born after September 1983, dummies for 2 intervals of
family income (60-100 percent of poverty and 100-133 percent of poverty), and dummies for19
23The models also include region and year effects and controls for race, ethnicity, and
family structure. 
24We examined whether the apparent negative effect of the expansions on AFDC
participation was due to our assumption of the full child care disregard for children under six
only.  In preliminary work we re-estimated the models using alternative assumptions–that no
child care disregard was taken, or that the full amount was taken for children of all ages–we
found that the AFDC effect became smaller in absolute value while the other coefficients
remained largely unchanged. 
three age/poverty subgroups: those age six or older but born after September 1983 with family
income less than 100% of poverty (who were only eligible for Medicaid under the 100 percent
expansion); those under six with family income less than 100% of poverty (who were eligible
under both the 100 percent and 133 percent expansions); and those under six with family income
from 100 to 133 percent of poverty (who were only eligible under the 133 percent expansion).
23 
The results in the first column show that potential eligibility under the 100 percent
expansion, or under both expansions, was associated with about a 74 percent increase in
Medicaid eligibility (consistent with our robustness check of the results in Table 3), whereas
potential eligibility under the 133 expansion was associated with an 83 percent rise in eligibility
(consistent with the results in Table 4).  The estimated effects on Medicaid coverage in the
second column show that children who were eligible for the 100 percent expansion only, or for
both expansions, had 8-11 percentage point gains in Medicaid enrollment, while those who were
eligible for the 133 percent expansion had a slight decline in Medicaid coverage.  As in Table 4,
the latter effect is attributable to a negative estimated effect of eligibility for the 133 percent
expansion on AFDC coverage.
24  The models for any health insurance and other insurance show
no evidence of crowd-out among the groups who were eligible under the 100 percent expansion
only, or under the 133 percent expansion only, but some weak evidence of crowd-out for the dual20
coverage subgroup.  Nevertheless, given the limited precision of the estimates, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the dual coverage group and the 100 percent-only group have the same
responses, while the 133 percent-only group has zero responses on all margins.
To summarize, our results from the SIPP indicate that the 100 percent expansion led to
about a 7-8 percentage point rise in Medicaid coverage and overall health insurance coverage
among previously ineligible children, whereas the 133 percent expansion had little effect on
either.  Impacts for the set of younger children covered by both expansions are about the same as
for those covered by the 100 percent program only. 
VI.  Evidence from the March CPS
In view of the surprising results for the 133 percent expansion obtained from our SIPP
samples, we decided to look at the program using March CPS data.   Since the age limit of the
133 percent expansion falls at exactly six years, it is possible to distinguish eligible and ineligible
children using age data measured only in years.  The results are summarized in Table 6.   Despite
some small differences in the levels of Medicaid, AFDC, and health insurance coverage in the
CPS and SIPP, the differences-in-differences are very similar.  In particular, March CPS data
from 1991-93 suggest that OBRA 1989 had a very small effect on Medicaid coverage of children
under six in families with incomes from 100-133 percent of poverty – on the order of 3 percent. 
Despite the much larger CPS sample sizes, only two of the differences-in-differences are
statistically significant–the 3.4 percent effect on Medicaid coverage and the -3.3 percent effect on
other health insurance.  Paradoxically, the CPS data suggest that the133 percent expansion21
caused other insurance coverage to fall by about the same amount as the rise in Medicaid, leading
to no net change in overall health insurance coverage.  
We also conducted a year-by-year analysis using the CPS files for 1991 to 1996, to check
if the impact of the 133 percent expansion changed over time.  The results are summarized in
Table 7.  While there is some year-to-year variation, on balance we see no systematic effects of
OBRA 1989 on Medicaid enrollment or total health insurance coverage.  The (unweighted)
average of the six regression-adjusted difference-in-differences estimates of the impact on
Medicaid enrollment is 2.2 percent, while the corresponding average of the estimated effects on
overall coverage is 0 percent.  There is no evidence of increasing takeup of coverage offered by
the 133 percent expansion, or of increasing crowd-out effects.  If anything, the variability in
results from the six years suggest the need for caution in interpreting the point estimates from the
1991-93 sample. 
VII. Evidence from the Health Interview Survey
Our final set of estimates is based on data from the 1992-1996 Health Interview Surveys. 
We focus on three key dependent variables from the HIS:  Medicaid coverage, any health
insurance coverage, and the number of doctor visits in the past year.  Following previous
researchers (Holl et al., 1995; Currie and Gruber, 1996), we distinguish between children who
had at least one visit last year, and those who did not.  While many visits may indicate serious
health problems, at least one visit is interpreted in the literature as a positive indicator of access
to preventative medical care.22
25As described in the Data Appendix, we estimate the ratio of  family income to poverty
using income intervals reported in the HIS and family size information. We exclude the roughly
15 percent of individuals with missing family income information.
26The lines in Figure 6 are smoothed using a 3-quarter moving average with weights
(0.25, 0.5, 0.25).
The upper panel of Table 8 reports unadjusted and regression-adjusted difference-in-
differences estimates of the effect of the 100 percent poverty expansion, using children in
families with incomes from 60 to 140 percent of poverty born before and after September 30,
1983.
25  Since the public use samples of the HIS do not report state of residence, we cannot
estimate Medicaid (or AFDC) eligibility rates.  The estimated differences in differences of
Medicaid coverage and overall insurance coverage in the HIS sample are relatively precise, and
suggest that the 100 percent expansion significantly raised Medicaid enrollment and overall
health insurance coverage.  Using the 66 percentage point Medicaid eligibility increase estimated
from the SIPP (for a comparable sample that includes children in high AFDC benefit states), the
implied takeup rate for Medicaid coverage offered by the 100 percent expansion is 8-9 percent –
just slightly above our estimates from the SIPP.  The regression-adjusted HIS estimates suggest
that the 100 percent expansion raised Medicaid coverage a little more than overall coverage,
although the difference  – which is an estimate of the crowd-out effect – is not significant (t=0.8). 
The impact of the expansion is illustrated in Figure 6, which plots Medicaid enrollment rates by
quarter of birth for children in families just below and just above the poverty line.
26  As in Figure
3, there is a noticeable jump in Medicaid coverage after the September 30, 1983 eligibility date
for the poor children, and no such jump for the near-poor children.23
27The mean fractions of children with at least one doctor visit in the previous year for the
four groups used in the difference-in-differences are as follows: poor children born before
October 1983 – 65.2%; poor children born later – 83.1%; above-poverty children born before
October 1983 – 65.6%, above poverty children born later – 81.6%.
28This is the instrumental variables estimate of the effect of health insurance coverage on
the probability of visiting a doctor at least once, using the interaction of poor and born after
September 1983 as an instrument for coverage.
The results in the third column of Table 8 suggest that the 100 percent expansion also had
a positive effect on health care utilization.  The unadjusted effect on the likelihood of at least one
doctor visit in the past year is not quite statistically significant, while the regression-adjusted
effect is marginally so, with a t-ratio of 2.18.
27  Considering the rather modest estimate of the
expansion’s effect on insurance coverage, the effect on doctor visits is relatively large. 
Specifically, the estimates suggest that children with newly available health insurance coverage
have a 60% higher probability of at least one annual doctor visit than in the absence of the
expansion, although this estimate is rather imprecise (standard error 31%).
28  By comparison, an
OLS regression of doctor visits on insurance coverage and the same set of control variables has a
coefficient of only 12 percent (standard error 0.6 percent).  This pattern of results is consistent
with takeup occurring primarily among children who needed care or whose parents were
motivated to obtain preventive care for their children.  Unfortunately, we are unable to explore
this possibility further due to data limitations.
The models in the lower panel of Table 8 examine the combined effects of the 100 and
133 percent expansions, using the same framework as in Table 5.  The results are comparable to
those based on the SIPP, although in the HIS sample there is more evidence of an effect of the
133 percent program on Medicaid coverage.  Interestingly, however, this increase in Medicaid24
was not associated with a significant change in the probability of visiting a doctor.  It is also
interesting that among children eligible for the 100 percent expansion the SIPP sample showed
larger crowd-out effects for younger children who were also eligible for the 133 program, while
in the HIS sample any evidence of crowd-out is confined to the older children who were
excluded from the 133 percent program.
Overall, we interpret the HIS results as supportive of our findings from the SIPP and
CPS, although differences across the various specifications suggest the need for caution in
drawing strong inferences from any one data set.  Based on the combined evidence we conclude
that OBRA 1990 had a significant effect on Medicaid enrollment, with a takeup rate of around 8
percent.  It also increased overall health insurance coverage, with little or no crowd-out of non-
Medicaid coverage.  By comparison, the 133 percent expansion in OBRA 1989 had smaller
effects on Medicaid enrollment.  Our estimates suggest takeup rates on the order of 0-5 percent,
with the SIPP and March CPS estimates clustered around zero.  Our estimated impacts of the 133
percent expansion on overall health insurance coverage are, if anything, smaller than the
estimated impacts on Medicaid, implying that any impact on Medicaid was offset by reductions
in other coverage.
VIII.  Comparisons with Earlier Literature
Our analysis of the OBRA 1989 and OBRA 1990 Medicaid expansions point to much
lower estimated takeup rates, and lower rates of crowding out, than does the analysis by Cutler
and Gruber (1996).  In an effort to reconcile the evidence, we conducted a replication and re-
analysis of Cutler and Gruber’s main findings.  They estimate models of the form25
29They actually report models for non-insurance status, but the effects on overall coverage
are equal and opposite.
(2) Yiast =  α + βXiast +  γEligiast +  εiast ,
where Yiast is an indicator for Medicaid enrollment (or another form of insurance coverage) for
individual i in age group a from state s in year t, Xiast is a set of observed characteristics of the
individual (including demographic characteristics), Eligiast is a dummy indicating whether the
individual is eligible for Medicaid, and εiast is an error term.  Cutler and Gruber calculate
eligibility for each child based on AFDC rules and the expansion provisions applicable for each
child (depending on age, state of residence, and family income and structure).  They estimate this
model by instrumental variables, using as an instrument for individual eligibility the average
eligibility rate of a nationally representative sample of children of age a under the laws in effect
in state s in year t.  They use samples of children under 18 in the March 1988-93 Current
Population Surveys, and include unrestricted state, year, and age dummies in their models.
Their main estimates are reproduced in the top row of Table 9.  The first column reports
IV estimates of the takeup rate for Medicaid coverage.  Their estimate (0.235) is substantially
larger than the takeup rates we estimate for OBRA 1989 or OBRA 1990 coverage, although they
are combining takeup rates for AFDC and expansion-based coverage.  The second column shows
their estimate of the crowd-out rate of private insurance.  This is negative and significant. 
Finally, the third column presents their estimate of the effect on overall insurance coverage.
29  As
we noted earlier in the paper, this is only one-half as large as the effect on Medicaid enrollment,
implying substantial slippage between gains in Medicaid and gains in overall coverage.  26
Our replications of Cutler and Gruber’s estimates are reported in the second row of Table
9.  We can approximately replicate their estimated coefficients, and we obtain identical estimates
of the sampling errors of the coefficients.
As noted by Cutler and Gruber (1996, page 406) their identification strategy mixes state
and national level sources of variation in Medicaid eligibility.  It also imposes the assumption
that in the absence of the expansions Medicaid participation rates of different age groups would
have moved in parallel over time.  Row 3 of Table 9 reports estimates from a specification that
relaxes this assumption by including age×year dummies.  This turns out to have an important
impact on the estimates of the Medicaid takeup rate and the crowd-out rate, lowering the
estimated takeup rate by 50 percent and reducing the magnitude of the crowd-out effect by 75
percent.  As shown in the last row of the table, adding a full set of two-way interactions to the
model, and relying on the three-way interaction between state, year, and age as the source of
identification, leads to very similar (though less precise) estimates.  Interestingly, estimates from
the less restrictive specifications in rows 3 and 4 are very comparable to our estimates, showing
about an 11 percent takeup rate for Medicaid coverage and small and statistically insignificant
crowd-out effects.  We conclude that our results from a regression-discontinuity analysis of the
two major federal Medicaid expansions are fully consistent with results that rely on state-level
variation in the eligibility rules for different age groups.  
VIII.  Explanations for Differential Takeup of the 100 Percent and 133 Percent Expansions
The contrast between the modest but positive impacts of the OBRA 1990 expansion and
the more limited effects of the OBRA 1989 expansion raises the question: what factors can27
explain the differential impact of these two laws?   One hypothesis is that the higher-income
families eligible for coverage under the 133 percent expansion have a relatively low probability
of remaining Medicaid-eligible in the near future, and are therefore less willing to undertake a
lengthy enrollment process than families with a higher probability of continuing eligibility.  To
evaluate this hypothesis, we used the 1992 and 1993 SIPP panels to calculate Medicaid eligibility
status 12 months after the first interview for children in different eligibility groups at the first
interview.  As expected, future eligibility rates are somewhat lower for families covered only by
the 133 percent expansion (61 percent) than for families eligible at the first interview via the 100
percent expansion only (64 percent) or via both expansions (73 percent).  The differences are
very small, however.
Another hypothesis is that families affected by the 133 percent expansion have less
experience with means-tested benefit programs and therefore have less information about such
programs, or perhaps attach greater stigma to participating in them.  Comparisons of the
characteristics of the children and families in the different eligibility groups suggest that there
may be some truth to this idea.  For example, families in the 133-percent-only eligibility group
are less likely to be female-headed or black than families in the 100-percent-only eligibility
group: both characteristics are highly correlated with welfare participation rates.   More formally,
we compared the previous welfare and Medicaid participation histories of children in the 16
th
month of the 1992 and 1993 SIPP panels who were eligible for Medicaid under the 100 percent
and 133 percent expansions.  As expected,  families of children who are eligible under the 133-
percent expansion have lower rates of participation in Medicaid one year earlier (25 percent) than
families of children who are eligible under the 100 percent expansion (38 percent) or under both28
expansions (44 percent).  Nevertheless, the difference is modest.  Moreover, our analysis of the
March CPS data over the 1991-96 period shows no evidence of rising takeup rates for children
eligible for the 133 percent program, so it seems unlikely that “slow learning” can explain the
limited effect of OBRA 1989.
IX.  Conclusions
This paper presents new estimates of the effects of the federal Medicaid expansions in the
early 1990s, using comparisons of children close to the eligibility limits of the laws.   We find
that the OBRA 1990 expansion – which extended Medicaid eligibility to children born after
September 30, 1983 in families below the poverty line – led to about an 8 percentage point rise in
Medicaid coverage for children just inside the eligibility limits, and a similar rise in overall
health insurance.  It also increased the fraction of children in the newly eligible group with a
doctor visit in the previous year.  The impacts of the expansion on Medicaid enrollments are
discernable from a simple graphical analysis, in conventional differences-in-differences, and in a
regression-discontinuity framework.   Nevertheless, the takeup rate in the newly eligible
population was low.   The OBRA 1989 expansion – which opened up Medicaid to children under
six in families with incomes below 133 percent of the poverty line – had even smaller impacts. 
We find no effect of the 133 percent expansion on Medicaid coverage of children close to the
eligibility limits of the law in the SIPP or CPS.  Even in the HIS, which shows a small effect on
Medicaid enrollment, there is no effect on overall health insurance coverage.
Our findings suggest that the overall impact of the Medicaid expansions was substantially
limited by low takeup rates among the newly eligible children, rather than by the crowding out of29
other forms of health insurance coverage.  This is in contrast to the well-known study by Cutler
and Gruber (1996) which argued that the Medicaid expansions led to higher takeup rates of
coverage (roughly 25 percent), but substantial losses in private coverage.   A replication and re-
analysis of their evidence shows that the relatively large takeup and crowdout estimates arise
from their restrictive empirical specifications, rather than from their use of state-level variation in
Medicaid laws.  Less restrictive specifications, including models that rely exclusively on state-
specific eligibility laws, yield estimated takeup and crowdout rates nearly identical to ours.30
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Data Appendix
Surveys of Income and Program Participation
Our SIPP samples are taken from the 1990-1993 full panel research files.  The samples
include individuals up to 18 years of age in the 4
th interview month who are neither the head of a
family nor the spouse of a head.  Individuals in 9 states that are not separately identified are
dropped.  We constructed nuclear families for the children in our sample using information on
relationship to household head, family status, and relationship to family head.  In most cases the
re-constructed families correspond to the members of the SIPP households.  In cases where a
child and his or her parent(s) live with other adults, however, our families include only the
children and parent(s) of the appropriate subfamily.  This definition corresponds to the family
benefit unit that would be potentially eligible for AFDC or Medicaid.  Variables such as family
income and family structure are then calculated by summing the individual values for people in
the family.  We also assign family-specific poverty thresholds based on family size and year.
To determine the maximum income cutoff for AFDC, we merge AFDC benefit levels and
need standards to individuals, based on state of residence and family size.  There are two income
tests that a family must pass in order to qualify for AFDC – the “gross test”, which requires that a
family’s gross income be less than 1.85 times the state’s need standard, and the “net test”, which
requires that a family’s income after disregards be less than the state’s payment standard.  In
determining AFDC eligibility, families are permitted to disregard actual child care expenses up
to a maximum of $175 per month ($200 per month for children under 2).   Since we do not know
actual child care expenses, we assume that families deduct the full disregard for all children
under age 6, and no disregard for older children.  This assumption overstates the amount of the
disregard for families that use informal or low cost care, and understates the disregard for
families that pay for care for children older than 6.  Income eligibility cutoffs for Medicaid are
determined using the age of the child, the ratio of family nonwelfare income to the family-
specific poverty line, and the parameters of the relevant state Medicaid programs.
Current Population Surveys
We use data for individuals 18 and younger who are neither the head of a family nor the
spouse of a head from the 1989-1999 March Current Population Surveys.  Since subfamilies are
identified directly in the CPS, we use subfamily income and poverty levels to assign income
relative to the family poverty level.  Income eligibility cutoffs for AFDC and Medicaid are
determined as in the SIPP.   We use information on health insurance coverage from the
individual responses and the children’s recoded variables to assign Medicaid and other insurance
coverage.
Health Interview Surveys
We use data for individuals age 18 or younger who are neither the head nor the spouse of
a head in the 1992-1996 Health Interview Surveys.  We exclude observations with missing
family income, Medicaid coverage, parental status, or birth month/year.  We assign midpoint
values to the HIS categorical annual family income variable, and we use information on the
number of individuals in the family to assign approximate family poverty lines.  We assign33
Medicaid coverage to individuals who report that they are covered by Medicaid or other public
assistance health insurance programs.  We assign overall coverage if an individual has Medicaid,
private health insurance, or military coverage. Appendix Table 1: Characteristics of Children in 1992-93 SIPP,
March CPS, and HIS
March HIS:
SIPP CPS All with Income
Percent Age 0-5 Years 33.3 34.0 33.7 34.0
Percent Born After 9/30/1983 49.1 –- 50.7 51.2
Percent Black 16.7 15.8 15.8 14.8
Percent Hispanic 13.8 11.6 13.0 12.8
Percent with Single Mother 24.4 24.4 16.1 16.1
Percent Below Pov. Line 25.6 23.4 22.0 22.0
Percent 100-200% Pov. Line 22.4 21.0 26.7 26.7
Percent on AFDC 11.0 13.2 –- --
Percent on Medicaid 18.0 20.3 17.3 17.1
Percent on Medicaid not AFDC 7.0 7.5 –- --
Percent with Health Insurance 85.8 87.4 81.9 84.0
Number Observations 28,557 88,227 52,796 45,000
Notes: Sample includes individuals age 0-18 in wave 1 of the 1992 and
1993 SIPP panels, the 1992 and 1993 March CPS, and the 1992 and 1993
Health Interview Surveys. SIPP sample excludes observations in Maine,
Vermont, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Idaho, Montana,
Wyoming. HIS sample excludes observations with missing birth date
information. All means are weighted.Table 1: Estimated Medicaid Eligibility Rates for Children in the
March Current Population Survey
Total Eligibility Source:
Survey Eligible OBRA OBRA State
Year (Percent) AFDC MCCA 1989 1990 Program
1988 16.7 16.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
1989 16.3 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
1990 17.2 16.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
1991 20.4 16.6 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.4
1992 23.1 17.4 0.1 3.6 1.0 1.1
1993 26.1 17.0 0.0 4.0 1.4 3.8
1994 28.6 17.0 0.1 4.3 2.0 5.2
Note: See text for description of eligibility sources. Based on
samples of children under 18 not heading their own families.Table 2: Characteristics of Children in 1990-1993 SIPP Panels
1990 1991 1992 1993
Age Distribution:
Percent Age 0-5 Years 33.3 32.9 33.5 33.2
Percent Age 6+ and Born 2.5 7.9 13.1 18.4
After September 30, 1983
Family Income Distribution Relative to Poverty Line and AFDC Cutoff:
Mean AFDC Income Cutoff 68.9 67.4 63.1 60.2
(percent of Poverty)
Percent Below AFDC Cutoff 16.4 18.6 17.5 18.6
Percent Between AFDC Cutoff 5.5 6.2 7.0 8.1
and Poverty Line
Percent Between Poverty Line 7.3 6.7 7.1 6.7
and 133% of Poverty
Medicaid Eligibility:
Mean Medicaid Income Cutoff 77.2 86.6 92.7 111.9
(Percent of Pov. Line)
Percent Eligible for AFDC 16.4 18.6 17.5 18.6
Percent Eligible through 1.7 4.2 6.4 10.7
Expansions
Source of Expansion Coverage:
Infant Coverage (MCCA) 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0
133% Expansion (OBRA 1989) 0.7 3.2 3.6 3.8
100% Expansion (OBRA 1990) 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.6
Optional State Program 0.4 0.2 0.8 4.4
AFDC and Medicaid Participation:
Percent on AFDC 8.4 9.9 10.0 12.0
Percent on Medicaid 12.1 15.6 16.2 19.7
Percent on Medicaid not AFDC 3.7 5.7 6.2 7.7
Percent of Medicaid Recipients 30.7 36.4 38.3 39.1
Not on AFDC
Number Observations 16,196 10,268 14,063 14,494
Notes: Sample includes individuals age 0-18 in wave 1 of the SIPP
panels who are not heads of families. Characteristics are measured as
of the fourth interview month. See text for description of AFDC and
Medicaid income cutoffs. Means are weighted by first year weights.
(All subsequent calculations use first year weights unless otherwise
noted.)Table 3: Medicaid Eligibility and Program Participation for Children Eligible and Ineligible for 100 Percent Program, 1992-
1993 SIPP Panels
Percent Percent Percent on Percent Percent
Number Medicaid Covered by Percent Medicaid with Any with Other
Obs. Eligible Medicaid on AFDC not AFDC Insurance Insurance
Family Income 60-100% of Poverty Line:
Born Before 10/1/83 813 6.9 18.1 7.4 10.8 54.6 36.5
(0.9) (1.4) (0.9) (1.1) (1.7) (1.7)
Born 10/1/83 or Later 247 100.0 32.7 7.0 25.7 65.5 32.8
and Age 6 or Older (0.0) (3.0) (1.6) (2.8) (3.0) (3.0)
Born 10/1/83 or Later 597 100.0 40.6 6.0 33.3 70.0 29.4
(0.0) (2.0) (1.0) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9)
Family Income 100-140% of Poverty Line:
Born Before 10/1/83 806 3.6 8.7 1.2 7.6 64.6 55.9
(0.7) (1.0) (0.4) (0.9) (1.7) (1.7)
Born 10/1/83 or Later 274 6.0 14.9 2.4 12.5 65.1 50.3
and Age 6 or Older (1.4) (2.1) (0.9) (2.0) (2.9) (3.0)
Born 10/1/83 or Later 661 50.9 16.9 1.8 15.1 70.5 53.6
(1.9) (1.5) (0.5) (1.4) (1.8) (1.9)
Comparison of Children Born Before and After 10/1/83 in Poor and Near-Poor Families:
Ages 6 and Older Only:
Difference-in-Differences -- 90.7 8.5 -1.6 10.0 10.4 1.9
(1.8) (4.0) (2.1) (3.7) (4.8) (4.9)
Regression-Adjusted D-in-D -- 91.8 6.9 -2.9 9.7 9.9 3.0
(1.9) (3.6) (2.0) (3.2) (4.9) (4.9)
All Ages
Difference-in-Differences -- 45.8 14.3 -2.0 16.3 9.5 -4.8
(2.1) (3.0) (1.5) (2.8) (3.5) (3.6)
Regression-Adjusted D-in-D -- 92.3 6.8 -2.8 9.6 10.0 3.2
(2.1) (3.8) (2.0) (3.5) (4.8) (4.9)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes children in month 4 of 1992 and 1993 SIPP in families with incomes
from 60-140% of poverty line and with family-specific AFDC eligibility thresholds under 70% of poverty line. Regression-
adjusted difference-in-differences includes cubic in age (in months), dummy for age under 6 interacted with dummy for income
below poverty, dummies for black, Hispanic, single mother, dummies for region interacted with survey year, ratio of family
income to poverty line and its square, dummy if family income below poverty line, dummy if born after 10/1/83, and interaction
of dummies for income below poverty line and born after 10/1/83 (reported in table).Table 4: Comparisons of Medicaid Eligibility and Program Participation Rates for Children Eligible and
Ineligible for 133% Program, 1991-1993 SIPP Panels
Percent Percent Percent on Percent Percent
Number Medicaid Covered by Percent Medicaid with Any with Other
Obs. Eligible Medicaid on AFDC not AFDC Insurance Insurance
Family Income 100-133% of Poverty Line:
Age 6 and Older 1474 8.3 12.8 3.0 9.8 65.7 52.9
(0.7) (0.9) (0.4) (0.8) (1.2) (1.3)
Under Age 6 776 100.0 20.6 2.4 18.2 76.6 56.0
(0.0) (1.5) (0.5) (1.4) (1.5) (1.8)
Family Income 133-166% of Poverty Line:
Age 6 and Older 1677 7.9 6.6 1.2 5.4 74.3 67.7
(0.7) (0.6) (0.3) (0.6) (1.1) (1.1)
Under Age 6 906 15.1 12.9 1.6 11.3 84.4 71.5
(1.2) (1.1) (0.4) (1.1) (1.2) (1.5)
Comparisons of Children Under and Older than 6 in Families Above and Below 133% Poverty Limit
Difference-in-Differences -- 84.6 1.5 -1.1 2.6 0.7 -0.7
(1.5) (2.1) (0.9) (2.0) (2.5) (2.9)
Regression-Adjusted D-in-D -- 85.8 2.0 -1.0 2.9 0.9 -1.1
(1.4) (1.9) (0.8) (1.8) (2.6) (2.9)
Regression-Adjusted D-in-D -- 82.9 -0.8 -1.3 0.5 1.4 2.2
1992 and 1993 ONLY (1.8) (2.2) (0.9) (2.1) (3.1) (3.4)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes children in month 4 of 1991-1993 SIPP in families with incomes from
100-166% of poverty line and with family-specific AFDC eligibility thresholds under 100% of poverty line. Regression-adjusted
difference-in-differences includes cubic in age (in months), dummies for black, Hispanic, single mother, Census region
interacted with survey year, ratio of family income to poverty line and its square, dummy if family income is below 133% of
poverty line, dummy if under age 6, and interaction of dummies for income below 133% of poverty line and under age 6 (reported
in table).Table 5: Combined Models for Medicaid Eligibility and Program Participation Rates for Children in Families with Incomes from
60 to 166 Percent of Poverty, 1992-1993 SIPP Panels
On Have
Medicaid Covered by Medicaid Have Any Other
Eligible Medicaid On AFDC not AFDC Insurance Insurance
1. Age 6 or more, Born After 74.1 8.1 -2.1 10.2 8.4 0.3
9/83, Family Income < Poverty (2.0) (2.9) (1.6) (2.7) (3.5) (3.7)
(100 percent expansion only)
2. Under Age 6, Born After 9/83, 73.3 10.9 -1.5 12.4 5.3 -5.6
Family Income < Poverty (1.8) (2.6) (1.4) (2.4) (3.2) (3.3)
(100 and 133 percent expansions)
3. Under Age 6, Family Income 82.8 -1.0 -1.2 0.2 1.7 2.7
100-133% of Poverty (1.8) (2.6) (1.4) (2.4) (3.2) (3.3)
(133 percent expansion only)
4. P-value of Test: 0.00 0.54 0.54 0.77 0.50 0.14
coefficients in rows 1 and
2 are equal; coefficient in
r o w3i s0 .
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models are fit to sample of 5,555 children in 1992 and 1993 SIPP with family incomes
from 60 to 166% of the poverty line. All models include cubic in age (in months), dummy for age under 6, dummy if born after
10/1/83, dummy if family income below poverty, dummy if family income below 133% of poverty, dummies for black, Hispanic, and
single mother, dummies for Census region interacted with survey year, ratio of family income to poverty line and its square,
and the three dummies reported in the table.Table 6: Comparisons of Medicaid Eligibility and Participation Rates for Children Older and Younger than Age 6 in Families
Above and Below 133% of the Poverty Line, 1991-1993 March CPS
Percent Percent Percent on Percent Percent
Number Medicaid Covered by Percent Medicaid with Any with Other
Obs. Eligible Medicaid on AFDC not AFDC Insurance Insurance
Family Income 100-133% of Poverty Line:
Age 6 and Older 6012 7.2 19.0 8.3 11.9 70.0 56.6
(0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6)
Under Age 6 2600 100.0 29.8 10.4 19.5 76.7 56.4
(0.0) (0.9) (0.6) (0.8) (0.8) (1.0)
Family Income 133-166% of Poverty Line:
Age 6 and Older 6202 6.8 10.9 3.8 7.7 74.1 67.8
(0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (0.3) (0.6) (0.6)
Under Age 6 2731 14.0 18.5 5.3 13.6 81.7 71.0
(0.7) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7) (0.7) (0.9)
Comparisons of Children Under and Older than 6 in Families Above and Below 133% Poverty Limit
Difference-in-Differences -- 85.6 3.2 0.7 1.8 -0.9 -3.4
(0.8) (1.3) (0.9) (1.1) (1.4) (1.6)
Regression-Adjusted D-in-D -- 85.7 3.4 0.9 1.7 -0.6 -3.3
(0.6) (1.2) (0.8) (1.0) (1.4) (1.5)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes children in 1991-1993 March CPS in families with incomes from 100-
166% of poverty line and with family-specific AFDC eligibility thresholds under 100% of poverty line. Regression-adjusted
difference-in-differences includes age in years, dummy for age under 6, dummies for black, Hispanic, single mother, dummies
for Census region interacted with CPS year, ratio of family income to poverty line and its square, dummy if family income
below 133% of poverty line, dummy if under age 6, and interaction of dummies for income below 133% of poverty line and under
age 6 (reported in table).Table 7: Comparisons of Medicaid Eligibility and Participation Rates for Children
Older and Younger than Age 6 in Families Above and Below 133% of the Poverty Line,
1991-1996 March CPS
Percent Percent Percent on Percent Percent
Medicaid Covered by Percent Medicaid with Any with Other
CPS Year Eligible Medicaid on AFDC not AFDC Insurance Insurance
1991 93.9 6.3 1.0 4.8 -0.8 -7.2
(0.6) (2.0) (1.4) (1.6) (2.5) (2.7)
1992 85.4 0.9 -0.7 0.6 1.8 1.5
(1.1) (2.2) (1.4) (1.8) (2.4) (2.7)
1993 78.4 2.3 2.5 -0.9 -2.6 -3.3
(1.4) (2.2) (1.3) (1.9) (2.4) (2.7)
1994 66.3 1.2 -1.3 2.0 1.6 1.4
(1.5) (2.3) (1.3) (2.1) (2.3) (2.6)
1995 72.7 -1.2 1.6 -2.4 0.2 0.9
(1.4) (2.4) (1.4) (2.1) (2.4) (2.7)
1996 82.9 3.8 4.9 -0.0 -0.2 -4.8
(1.1) (2.5) (1.6) (2.3) (2.5) (2.8)
Note: Table entries are regression-adjusted differences in differences. See note to
Table 6 for model specifications and sample definitions.Table 8: Health Insurance Coverage and Probability of At Least One Doctor
Visit, 1992-1996 HIS
At Least One
Covered by Have Any Doctor Visit
Medicaid Insurance in Past Year
A. Analysis of 100% Program Only: Children in Families
with Incomes from 60-140% of Poverty (n=24,964)
(a) Unadjusted Difference 5.0 6.8 1.8
in Differences (1.2) (1.2) (1.1)
(a) Regression-Adjusted 6.0 4.8 2.9
D-in-D (1.5) (1.5) (1.3)
B. Analysis of 100% and 133% Programs: Children in Families
with Incomes from 60-166% of Poverty (n=32,617)
(c) Age 6 or More, Born After 8.0 5.3 3.8
9/83, Family Income < Pov. (1.2) (1.3) (1.2)
(100 percent expansion only)
(d) Under Age 6, Born After 9/83 9.6 9.3 1.6
Family Income < Pov. (1.3) (1.3) (1.2)
(100 and 133 percent expansions)
(e) Under Age 6, Family Income 5.8 2.7 0.5
100-133% of Poverty (1.2) (1.4) (1.2)
(133 percent expansion only)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Samples include children age 0-18 in
1992-1996 Health Interview Surveys who report non-missing data on family
income, Medicaid coverage, and date of birth. Family-specific poverty lines
are assigned using family size information and midpoints of reported family
income categories. Specifications in Panel A are the same as in Table 3.









































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Entries are the coefficients on
imputed Medicaid eligibility from instrumental variables regressions, using
the percentage of a national sample simulated to be eligible in each state-
year-age cell as the instrument. Models are fit to 266,421 observations of
children age 18 and under from the 1988-1993 March Current Population
Surveys and include the number of people in the family and dummies for age,
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